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I. INTRODUCTION 
The South African trust is best described as an “evolutionary 
hybrid”—a product of the coalescence of Roman-Dutch civil law 
and English common law in South Africa’s mixed legal system.1 
The South African trust, like its Anglo-American counterparts, is 
essentially an administrative device through which a trustee 
controls property for the benefit of the trust beneficiaries.
2
 
However, the South African trust, unlike its Anglo-American 
                                                                                                             
   University of the Western Cape, Faculty of Law (South Africa); LL.B., 
LL.M., LL.D., University of Stellenbosch (South Africa). I am grateful to Profs. 
Marius de Waal (University of Stellenbosch) and Bradley Smith (University of 
the Free State) for their valuable commentary on an earlier draft of the article. 
 1. A description proffered by Tony Honoré, Trust in SOUTHERN CROSS: 
CIVIL LAW AND COMMON LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA 849, 850 (R. Zimmermann & 
D. Visser eds., 1996). 
 2. Braun v. Blann and Botha NNO and Another 1984 (2) SA 850 (A) 
859H. 
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counterparts, is not premised on any dichotomy of ownership. This 
is because the law/equity-divide in English law and its incidental 
duality of legal and equitable ownership are foreign to South 
African law’s adherence, in typical civilian fashion, to singular (or 
unitary) ownership.
3
 Instead, the separation of estates (or 
patrimonies)
4
 is fundamental to the conceptualization of the South 
African trust—a trust constitutes a special estate, distinct from but 
held contemporaneously with, the trustee’s personal (or general) 
estate.
5
 The South African Supreme Court of Appeal confirmed the 
separateness of a trust estate in Land and Agricultural Bank of 
South Africa v. Parker and Others
6
 when it described a trust estate 
as an accumulation of assets and liabilities which vests as a 
separate entity, devoid of legal personality, in trustees.
7
 The Court 
confirmed, furthermore, that the “core idea” of the South African 
trust lies in a functional separation between trustees’ control over 
the trust property on the one hand, and trust beneficiaries’ 
enjoyment of the benefits yielded by that control on the other 
hand.
8
 The Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 is the statute that 
regulates aspects of South African trust law. Section 12 of the Act 
reinforces the separateness of a trust estate through its directive 
that trust property forms no part of a trustee’s personal estate 
except in the instance where a trustee is also a trust beneficiary and 
has, as such, a claim to the trust property. 
The foregoing synopsis explains why, where one of the spouses 
in divorce proceedings is the trustee of a trust, the trust assets are, 
                                                                                                             
 3. Id. at 859F. 
 4. The term “estate,” rather than “patrimony,” is generally used in South 
African legal parlance. 
 5. Marius J. de Waal, The Core Elements of the Trust: Aspects of the 
English, Scottish and South African Trusts Compared, 117 S. AFRICAN L.J. 548, 
559–63 (2000). See also generally George L. Gretton, Trusts without Equity, 49 
INT’L. & COMP. L.Q. 599, 608–15 (2000). 
 6. Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v. Parker and Others 2005 
(2) SA 77 (SCA). The Supreme Court of Appeal is South Africa’s highest court 
in non-constitutional matters. 
 7. Id. at para. 10. 
 8. Id. at para. 19. 
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in principle, excluded from the determination of the patrimonial 
consequences of that divorce. The patrimonial consequences of the 
divorce impact on the divorcing spouses’ personal estates, or, in 
the case of a marriage in community of property, on the spouses’ 
joint estate. Where one spouse is the trustee of a trust, such a trust 
constitutes a separate estate in that spouse’s hands and, 
consequently, the trust property forms no part of the trustee-
spouse’s personal estate or, in the case of community of property, 
the spouses’ joint estate. However, this ostensibly straightforward 
legal position has been increasingly challenged before South 
African courts since the advent of the twenty-first century. These 
challenges occurred particularly in the context of the emergence of 
a “newer type of trust”9 in South Africa since the 1990s. The 
Supreme Court of Appeal described this newer type of trust in 
Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v. Parker, its seminal 
judgment on point, as one under which the trust’s abovementioned 
core idea is debased because the trust form is employed not to 
separate trust beneficiaries’ beneficial interest from trustees’ 
control over trust property, but rather to permit everything to 
remain “as before.”10 This occurs typically when a trust’s trustees 
are also among the beneficiaries of that trust or, stated differently, 
when some of the trust beneficiaries control the selfsame trust as 
its trustees. In South Africa this newer type of trust is particularly 
prevalent in the family context when, for example, a husband sets 
up a trust with himself as trustee; and himself, his wife and their 
children as trust beneficiaries. The husband then administers the 
trust as if the trust property still formed part of his personal estate, 
and does so (by reason of the family dynamics at play) 
unchallenged by his family members who are the other 
beneficiaries of the trust. 
                                                                                                             
 9. A term first used by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Nieuwoudt and 
Another NNO v. Vrystaat Mielies (Edms) Bpk 2004 (3) SA 486 (SCA) para. 17. 
 10. Parker, 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA), para. 26. 
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A popular appellation in South African legal parlance for this 
newer type of trust is the so-called “alter ego trust”11—it portrays 
accurately the scenario in which a trustee controls the trust affairs 
with self-interest and with an utter disregard for the existence of 
the trust as a separate estate in which the trust beneficiaries are 
beneficially interested: the trust is nothing but the trustee’s (in the 
foregoing example, the husband’s) alter ego. The Supreme Court 
of Appeal opined in the Parker case that, in order to remedy 
trustees’ abuse of the trust through treating it as their alter ego and, 
in so doing, debasing the core idea of the trust, it is, in appropriate 
circumstances, permissible to find that “the trust form is a veneer 
that in justice should be pierced” in the interests of, for example, 
creditors.
12
 South African trust law has accepted “piercing the trust 
veneer” and its synonym “going behind the trust form”13 as 
suitable descriptions for those instances where the courts provide 
apposite relief when the trust form has been abused through 
trustees’ non-observance of the core idea of the trust. In light of the 
foregoing legal development, it was, predictably, only a matter of 
time before a trustee’s treatment of a trust as his or her alter ego 
through a disregard for the aforementioned control/enjoyment 
divide that typifies the South African trust would, when such a 
trustee engaged in divorce proceedings, elicit the averment from 
his or her spouse that the trust property should be considered 
alongside the property in the trustee-spouse’s personal estate, or 
the property in the spouses’ joint estate, for the purpose of 
determining the patrimonial consequences of the dissolution of 
their marriage. 
                                                                                                             
 11. Commissioner for Inland Revenue v. Pick ’n Pay Employee Share 
Purchase Trust 1992 (4) SA 39 (A) 59F was one of the first reported judgments 
in which a court used the expression. Senior v. Senior 1999 (4) SA 955 (W) 
964H was one of the first divorce cases in which the term was used. 
 12. Parker, 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA), para. 37.3. 
 13. See, e.g., Van Zyl and Another NNO v. Kaye NO and Others 2014 (4) 
SA 452 (WCC), para. 22. 
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This article analyzes some of the principal South African 
judgments on point in order to place in perspective the South 
African courts’ engagement with alter ego trusts in divorce cases. 
It is shown that, in particular, marriages concluded out of 
community of property have given rise to claims that trust assets 
should be considered alongside the property in trustee-spouses’ 
personal estates for the purpose of determining the patrimonial 
consequences of the dissolution of such marriages. These claims 
have been directed at either the addition of trust asset values to that 
of trustee-spouses’ personal estates for the purpose of effecting 
redistributions of assets (in terms of Section 7 of the Divorce Act 
70 of 1979) on the one hand, and the inclusion of trust asset values 
in the calculation of the growth of trustee-spouses’ personal estates 
stante matrimonio for the purpose of realizing accrual claims (in 
terms of Section 3 of the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984) on 
the other hand. Marriages concluded in community of property 
recently entered the fray when the South African Supreme Court of 
Appeal had to adjudicate on a prayer that trust assets be considered 
alongside the assets in divorcing spouses’ joint estate in order to 
effect the division of that estate. Part IV of the article is devoted to 
an analysis and evaluation of South African judgments on the 
(possible) interplay between trust law and matrimonial property 
law toward determining the patrimonial consequences of the 
dissolution of marriages through divorce. That investigation is 
preceded in Parts II and III of the article by brief contextualizing 
descriptions of South African matrimonial property systems and 
pertinent aspects of the patrimonial consequences of the 
dissolution of marriages, as well as essential aspects of South 
African courts’ power to go behind the trust form. 
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II. AN OVERVIEW OF SOUTH AFRICAN MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY 
REGIMES AND ASPECTS OF THE PATRIMONIAL CONSEQUENCES OF 
THE DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGES 
Universal community of property is South Africa’s primary (or 
default) matrimonial property system
14—upon conclusion of the 
marriage the spouses become tied co-owners in undivided and 
indivisible half-shares of all the assets and liabilities they have at 
the time of the marriage, as well as all the assets and liabilities they 
acquire during the subsistence of their marriage. Upon the 
dissolution of the marriage, all liabilities are settled from the joint 
estate and the balance of the joint estate is thereafter distributed 
equally between the spouses.
15
 
Spouses are (and have always been) free to depart from this 
default position by entering into a pre-nuptial contract. They may, 
therefore, opt to marry out of community of property with the 
exclusion of community of profit and loss—this is essentially a 
regime of complete separation of property.
16
 However, this regime 
is potentially prejudicial to the spouse who is in the weaker 
financial position—typically the spouse who is not the family’s 
primary breadwinner. Such a spouse, despite having contributed 
financially and/or otherwise to the growth of the other spouse’s 
estate, invariably finds him- or herself in an unfavorable position 
upon the dissolution of the marriage by reason of limited or no 
growth in his or her own estate during the subsistence of the 
marriage. Such a spouse has no entitlement to a share of the other 
spouse’s estate and, consequently, often finds him- or herself in a 
financial predicament upon the dissolution of the marriage.
17
 The 
Matrimonial Property Act, which commenced on November 1, 
1984, introduced measures to address this situation. These will be 
discussed in greater detail below. Even before the commencement 
                                                                                                             
 14. D.S.P. CRONJÉ & JACQUELINE HEATON, SOUTH AFRICAN FAMILY LAW 
65 (3rd ed., LexisNexis, Durban 2010). 
 15. Du Plessis v. Pienaar NO and Others 2003 (1) SA 671 (SCA), para. 1. 
 16. CRONJÉ & HEATON, supra note 14, at 65. 
 17. Id. at 93. 
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of the Matrimonial Property Act, spouses could combat the 
aforementioned potentially adverse financial consequences of a 
marriage subject to a complete separation of property by 
concluding a marriage out of community of property with the 
retention of community of profit and loss. This regime entailed that 
all profits and losses stante matrimonio constituted a joint estate of 
which each spouse owned an undivided half-share. However, 
spouses hardly exercised this option in the past.
18
 
The Matrimonial Property Act retained both of the 
aforementioned formats of the marriage out of community of 
property but, in an attempt to address the potential financial 
prejudice consequent upon this regime, introduced the accrual 
system in 1984. The Act stipulates that the accrual system applies 
to all marriages concluded out of community of property and 
community of profit and loss after the commencement of the Act, 
unless this system is expressly excluded in the spouses’ pre-nuptial 
contract.
19
 
The accrual system entails that each spouse controls his or her 
own estate during the subsistence of their marriage, but upon 
dissolution of the marriage, spouses share in the accrual, or 
growth, that their respective estates have shown during the course 
of the marriage. Such sharing is effected by entitling the spouse 
whose estate showed the smaller (or no) accrual during the 
subsistence of the marriage to a claim against the spouse whose 
estate showed the greater accrual stante matrimonio. This claim is 
for an amount equal to half of the difference between the accruals 
of the spouses’ respective estates.20 The accrual of an estate is the 
amount by which the net value of a spouse’s estate at the 
dissolution of the marriage exceeds the net value of that spouse’s 
estate at the commencement of that marriage.
21
 
                                                                                                             
 18. Id. at 92. 
 19. Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984, § 2. 
 20. Id. at § 3(1). 
 21. Id. at § 4(1)(a). If the net final value of a spouse’s estate is lower than 
the commencement value, no accrual has occurred in respect of that spouse’s 
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The example hereafter illustrates the operation of the accrual 
system. 
 
Spouse A commenced the marriage with an estate valued at ZAR 200,000. 
Spouse B commenced the marriage with an estate valued at ZAR 20,000. 
 
Spouse A’s estate is valued at ZAR 1 million upon the termination of the marriage 
through divorce. 
Spouse B’s estate is valued at ZAR 100,000 upon the termination of the marriage through 
divorce. 
 
Had the spouses been married subject to a complete separation of property, Spouse A 
would exit the marriage with ZAR 1 million and Spouse B would exit the marriage with 
ZAR 100,000. 
 
However, if the spouses married out of community of property but subject to the accrual 
system, Spouse B (the spouse whose estate accrued the least during the subsistence of the 
marriage) will have a claim against Spouse A upon the termination of the marriage 
through divorce. 
 
The extent of Spouse B’s claim is calculated as follows: 
Accrual of Spouse A’s estate: ZAR 1 million (final value) – ZAR 200,000 
(commencement value) = ZAR 800,000. 
Accrual of Spouse B’s estate: ZAR 100,000 (final value) – ZAR 20,000 (commencement 
value) = ZAR 80,000. 
 
The difference between the respective accruals: ZAR 800,000 (Spouse A’s accrual) – 
ZAR 80,000 (Spouse B’s accrual) = ZAR 720,000. 
 
Half of the difference between the respective accruals: ZAR 720,000 ÷ 2 = ZAR 360,000. 
 
Spouse B will, therefore, have a claim against Spouse A for ZAR 360,000. 
 
Consequently, Spouse B will exit the marriage with ZAR 460,000 (ZAR 100,000 (Spouse 
B’s estate value) + ZAR 360,000 (Spouse B’s accrual claim)) and Spouse A will exit the 
marriage with ZAR 640,000 (ZAR 1 million (Spouse A’s estate value) – ZAR 360,000 
(Spouse B’s accrual claim)). 
 
The above example underscores the more equitable financial 
dispensation occasioned by the accrual system for the spouse who 
finds him- or herself in the financially weaker position upon the 
dissolution of the marriage. However, the Matrimonial Property 
                                                                                                             
 
estate. For the purpose of the final calculation, that spouse’s “accrual” is 
regarded as being zero: H.R. HAHLO, THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW OF HUSBAND 
AND WIFE 305 (5th ed., Juta & Co., Ltd. 1985). 
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Act did not introduce the accrual system retroactively; 
consequently, a spouse to a marriage concluded subject to a 
complete separation of property that was entered into prior to the 
commencement of the Act may still find him- or herself in a 
precarious financial position if that marriage was to be dissolved 
by divorce today. In order to alleviate such potential prejudice, 
Section 7 of the Divorce Act permits one spouse (typically the 
spouse in the financially weaker position) to request a so-called 
“redistribution of assets” whereby a court, when issuing a decree 
of divorce, orders a transfer of the other spouse’s assets or such 
part of the other spouse’s assets to the first-mentioned spouse as 
the court deems just. Apposite provisions of Section 7 determine 
that: 
 the redistribution dispensation only applies to marriages 
with complete separation of property entered into before 
the enactment of the Matrimonial Property Act;
22
 
 a court granting a decree of divorce may, on application of 
one of the parties to the marriage and in the absence of an 
agreement between the parties regarding a division of their 
assets, order an equitable redistribution of assets in favor of 
the applying party;
23
 
 the court shall not grant a redistribution order unless it is 
satisfied that it is equitable and just to do so by reason of 
the fact that the party in whose favor the order is granted 
contributed directly or indirectly to the maintenance or 
increase of the estate of the other party during the 
subsistence of the marriage, either by the rendering of 
services, or the saving of expenses which would otherwise 
have been incurred, or in any other manner;
24
 and 
 in determining the extent of the redistribution of assets the 
court shall take into account inter alia the existing means of 
                                                                                                             
 22. Divorce Act 70 of 1979 § 7(3). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at § 7(4). 
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both parties, any donations made inter partes, as well as 
any other factor which the court deems pertinent.
25
 
It is evident from the preceding exposition that equitable 
considerations underpin the Divorce Act’s dispensation on the 
redistribution of assets; moreover, that a court’s power to issue a 
redistribution order is not only discretionary in nature but is also 
designed to achieve a just patrimonial settlement between the 
divorcing spouses. The Appellate Division
26
 confirmed this truism 
in Beaumont v. Beaumont
27
 when it said: 
[T]he feature of overriding importance in the exercise of 
the Court’s discretion as to what proportion of assets is to 
be transferred in terms of subsection (3) is the court’s 
assessment of what would be “just,” having regard to the 
factors mentioned specifically and to “any other factor 
which should in the opinion of the Court be taken into 
account. 
. . . The Legislature has seen fit to confer a wide discretion 
upon the courts, and the flexibility in the application of 
subsection (3) thus created ought not . . . to be curtailed by 
placing judicial glosses on the subsection in the form of 
guidelines as to the determination of what would be a just 
redistribution order.
28
 
It is important to note at this juncture that South African law, 
unlike its Anglo-American counterparts, is not typified by equity 
as a body of law. South African courts are not permitted, therefore, 
to grant relief exclusively on the ground of equity in instances 
where a statute and/or the common law do not afford apposite 
remedies.
29
 However, the South African legislature can incorporate 
notions such as reasonableness, fairness, equity and justness into 
statutory prescripts, usually in conjunction with other objectively-
                                                                                                             
 25. Id. at § 7(5). 
 26. The former appellation of the Supreme Court of Appeal. 
 27. Beaumont v. Beaumont 1987 (1) SA 967 (A). 
 28. Id. at 991E–H (emphasis added). 
 29. In Potgieter and Another v. Potgieter NO and Others 2012 (1) SA 637 
(SCA) the Supreme Court of Appeal cautioned strenuously against judicial 
invocation of reasonableness and fairness as freestanding norms by reason of the 
potential for “intolerable legal uncertainty” and the resultant threat to the rule of 
law in South Africa: paras. 34, 36. 
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determinable criteria. Section 7 of the Divorce Act serves as a 
good example in this regard—a court in divorce proceedings can 
order an equitable redistribution of assets in favor of one of the 
spouses who was married subject to a complete separation of 
property, but the Section also sets out a number of objectively-
determinable criteria for the court to consider in the exercise of its 
discretion. 
III. “GOING BEHIND THE TRUST FORM:” A SYNOPSIS 
It was shown in the article’s introduction that claims regarding 
trust assets in divorce proceedings have arisen with regard to alter 
ego trusts in particular. These claims called for courts to consider 
trust assets alongside the assets in a spouse’s personal estate or the 
assets in the spouses’ joint estate. Claimants in these cases invoked 
the power of South African courts to go behind the trust form in 
order to provide relief in instances where trustees abused trusts 
through a disregard of the South African trust’s core idea.30 This 
phenomenon in divorce cases calls for some elaboration regarding 
the judicial power to go behind the trust form. A number of South 
African legal scholars have recently canvassed this topic
31
 and 
their endeavors need not be repeated here. It is, nevertheless, 
important to note de Waal’s submission that the cases to date 
where South African courts raised the possibility of going behind 
the trust form concerned instances in which trustees violated the 
core idea of the South African trust through their failure to adhere 
to the basic principles or core duties of trust administration.
32
 De 
Waal identifies the following as being among those principles or 
duties typically disregarded by trustees who treat trusts as their 
alter ego: the duty to exercise independence of judgment and 
                                                                                                             
 30. See supra Part I. 
 31. See, e.g., Marius J. de Waal, The Abuse of the Trust (or: “Going Behind 
the Trust Form”), 76 RABEL J. COMP. & INT’L. PRIV. L. 1078 (2012); Anton van 
der Linde, Debasement of the Core Idea of a Trust and the Need to Protect 
Third Parties, 75 J. CONTEMP. ROMAN-DUTCH L. 371 (2012). 
 32. de Waal, supra note 31, at 1095. 
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independent discretion; the duty to give effect to the trust deed, 
properly interpreted; and the principle that trustees must act with 
care, diligence and skill in the performance of their duties and the 
exercise of their powers.
33
 The joint-action rule, which requires co-
trustees to act jointly at all times, can be added to this list.
34
 In Van 
Zyl and Another NNO v. Kaye NO and Others
35
 the Court 
emphasized, furthermore, that South African courts’ power to 
remedy, when apposite, the abuse of the trust is founded upon a 
need to curb the unconscionable effects of trustees’ non-adherence 
to the aforementioned basic principles or core duties of trust 
administration. This exercise is, per definition, designed to achieve 
an equitable outcome. Binns-Ward J. remarked in Van Zyl: 
Going behind the trust form . . . essentially represents the 
provision by a court of an equitable remedy . . . . I consider 
it appropriate to describe it as an equitable remedy in the 
ordinary, rather than technical, sense of the term; one that 
lends itself to a flexible approach to fairly and justly 
address the consequences of an unconscionable abuse of 
the trust form in given circumstances. It is a remedy that 
will generally be given when the trust form is used in a 
dishonest or unconscionable manner to evade a liability, or 
avoid an obligation.
36
 
This dictum reveals that trustees’ abuse of the trust form 
frequently comes to light when they attempt, by invoking their 
failure to adhere to the basic principles or core duties of trust 
administration, to “evade a liability, or avoid an obligation” in a 
dishonest or unconscionable manner. South African case law 
shows that such attempts on the part of trustees to extricate 
themselves from a liability or an obligation is consistently part of a 
                                                                                                             
 33. Id. 
 34. In Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v. Parker and Others 
2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA), the Court characterized the joint-action rule as 
foundational to the development of South African trust law: para. 15. See also 
François du Toit, Co-Trusteeship and the Joint-Action Rule in South African 
Trust Law, 27 TRUST L. INT’L. 18 (2013). 
 35. Van Zyl and Another NNO v. Kaye NO and Others 2014 (4) SA 452 
(WCC). 
 36. Id. at para. 22. 
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larger stratagem, namely to conduct trust affairs with an utter 
disregard for the existence of the trust by treating the trust property 
as their own (in other words, by treating the trust as their alter ego) 
but then to invoke the existence of the trust only when it suits 
them.
37
 In Thorpe and Others v. Trittenwein and Another
38
 the 
Supreme Court of Appeal strenuously condemned this practice 
when it said that “[t]hose who choose to conduct business through 
the medium of trusts . . . cannot enjoy the advantage of a trust 
when it suits them and cry foul when it does not.”39 
The above exposition shows that South African courts will 
generally go behind the trust form to grant relief consequent upon 
trustees’ abuse of a trust when the trustees failed to adhere to the 
basic principles or core duties of trust administration; when they 
dishonestly or unconscionably relied on that very failure, 
frequently to extricate themselves from a liability or an obligation 
incurred as trustees; and when the trust was nothing more than the 
trustees’ alter ego, with its existence invoked only when it suited 
the trustees.
40
 It is important to note at this point that South African 
courts have drawn a vitally important distinction between the 
aforementioned abused-trust scenario on the one hand, and the 
sham-trust scenario on the other hand. In Van Zyl v. Kaye the Court 
                                                                                                             
 37. See, e.g., Van der Merwe NO and Others v. Hydraberg Hydraulics CC 
and Others; Van der Merwe NO and Others v. Bosman and Others 2010 (5) SA 
555 (WC) para. 39. 
 38. Thorpe and Others v. Trittenwein and Another 2007 (2) SA 172 (SCA). 
 39. Id. at para. 17. 
 40. See further Rees and Others v. Harris and Others 2012 (1) SA 583 
(GSJ) where the Court said that: 
where the trustees of a trust clearly do not treat the trust as a separate 
entity, and where special circumstances exist to show that there has 
been an abuse of the trust entity by a trustee, the [trust] veneer must be 
pierced. It follows that if a legitimately established trust is used 
or misused in an improper fashion by its trustees to perpetrate deceit, 
and/or fraud, the natural person behind the trust veneer must be held 
personally liable (para. 17).  
The Supreme Court of Appeal remarked in a similar fashion in WT and Others 
v. KT 2015 (3) SA 574 (SCA) that the “unconscionable abuse of the trust form 
through fraud, dishonesty or an improper purpose will justify looking behind the 
trust form”: para. 31. 
668 JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES [Vol. 8 
 
 
 
opined, rightly it is submitted, that any finding that a trust is a 
sham essentially entails a finding that some or all of the 
requirements for the establishment of that trust were not met, or 
that the appearance that those requirements were met was in reality 
a dissimulation.
41
 Where, however, trustees abused a trust in the 
manner explained earlier in this paragraph, a court may provide 
relief by going behind the trust form. The Van Zyl Court pointed 
out that going behind the trust form invariably entails an 
acceptance of the existence of a trust but necessitates a disregard of 
the ordinary consequences of such existence. A court going behind 
the trust form may, for example, hold trustees personally liable for 
an obligation ostensibly undertaken as trustees, or may hold the 
trust bound to transactions ostensibly undertaken by the trustees 
acting outside the parameters of their authority or legal capacity.
42
 
It stands to reason, therefore, that the sham-trust scenario leaves no 
room whatsoever for going behind the trust form because, in the 
words of Binns-Ward J. in Van Zyl, “[w]hen a trust is a sham, it 
does not exist and there is nothing to ‘go behind.’”43 The Van Zyl 
Court consequently cautioned against an erroneous conflation of, 
on the one hand, establishing that a trust is a sham with, on the 
other hand, going behind the trust form—the Court distinguished 
the two as “fundamentally different undertakings.”44 
The synoptic descriptions in Parts II and III of the article on 
South African matrimonial property regimes and aspects of the 
patrimonial consequences of divorce, along with the judicial 
practice of going behind the trust form provide the backdrop 
against which South African judgments on claims to trust assets in 
divorce proceedings can be considered next. 
 
                                                                                                             
 41. Van Zyl, 2014 (4) SA 452 (WCC), para. 19. 
 42. Id. at para. 21. 
 43. Id. at para. 16. See also De Waal, supra note 31, at 1084–1086. 
 44. Van Zyl, 2014 (4) SA 452 (WCC), para. 16. 
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IV. SOUTH AFRICAN JUDGMENTS ON CLAIMS REGARDING TRUST 
ASSETS IN DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS 
A. Claims for the Redistribution of Assets 
Jordaan v. Jordaan
45
 was one of the first reported judgments in 
which a South African High Court
46
 had an opportunity to consider 
whether, in making a redistribution order under Section 7 of the 
Divorce Act, the value of trust assets should be included in the 
determination of the value of one of the spouses’ estate. The Court 
ordered that the asset values of a number of inter vivos trusts 
created by the defendant (the husband) had to be included in the 
determination of the value of his personal estate because the 
evidence showed that he was in full control of these trusts and 
administered the trusts as if the trust property was vested in him 
personally.
47
 It is instructive to note that the Court’s consideration 
of the trust asset values occurred with express reference to the 
equitable underpinnings of the redistribution dispensation of the 
Divorce Act.
48
 The Court, moreover, distinguished redistribution 
claims in terms of the Divorce Act from accrual claims in terms of 
the Matrimonial Property Act, and intimated that the former 
permits greater scope than the latter for a court to take cognizance 
of all benefits enjoyed by a spouse in determining the patrimonial 
consequences of a divorce.
49
 
In Badenhorst v. Badenhorst
50
 the Supreme Court of Appeal 
subsequently acknowledged the Jordaan judgment and elaborated 
on the reasoning upon which an inclusion of the asset value of a 
trust in the value of a spouse’s personal estate toward the making 
of a redistribution order is founded. The Badenhorst case also 
illustrates the typical circumstances in which a trust may be 
                                                                                                             
 45. Jordaan v. Jordaan 2001 (3) SA 288 (C). 
 46. At the time still known as the Supreme Court. 
 47. Jordaan, 2001 (3) SA 288 (C), paras. 24–34. 
 48. Id. at paras. 21, 34. 
 49. Id. at para. 22. 
 50. Badenhorst v. Badenhorst 2006 (2) SA 255 (SCA). 
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considered as the alter ego of one of its trustees. In casu a husband 
(the plaintiff in the court of first instance, and the defendant on 
appeal) sued his wife (the appellant, and the defendant in the court 
of first instance) for a decree of divorce. The appellant 
counterclaimed in the court of first instance and, because the 
marriage was concluded out of community of property prior to the 
commencement of the Matrimonial Property Act, requested a 
redistribution of assets in terms of Section 7 of the Divorce Act. 
The appellant’s claim included the averment that the Court had to 
consider the assets of an inter vivos trust, of which the defendant 
was a co-trustee, in addition to the assets in the defendant’s 
personal estate. She contended, in support of this averment, that 
the trust was no more than the defendant’s alter ego.51 The court of 
first instance held that the trust in question constituted a separate 
legal entity and, therefore, that its assets had to be disregarded for 
the purpose of making a redistribution order.
52
 The appellant 
appealed against this aspect of the court of first instance’s 
judgment. 
The Supreme Court of Appeal acknowledged the fact that the 
trust assets were vested in its trustees and, therefore, did not form 
part of the defendant’s personal estate. The Court opined, however, 
that this fact did not per se exclude those assets from being 
considered for the purpose of making a redistribution order.
53
 The 
Court opined, furthermore, that, for the appellant to succeed in her 
claim that the Court should consider the value of the trust assets in 
its ruling on redistribution, she had to show that the defendant not 
only controlled the trust de jure as trustee, but was indeed in de 
facto control thereof in that, but for the trust, the trust assets would 
have vested in his personal estate. In order to determine whether 
the defendant exercised such de facto control over the trust, the 
Court had regard to the provisions of the trust deed as well as the 
                                                                                                             
 51. Id. at paras. 1–2. 
 52. Id. at paras. 5, 7. 
 53. Id. at para. 9. 
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manner in which the trustees conducted trust administration during 
the subsistence of the marriage.
54
 The Court noted, as far as the 
provisions of the trust deed were concerned, that, inter alia, the 
trust’s two co-trustees could determine the vesting dates of the 
trust income and capital benefits; the trust deed conferred on the 
defendant the right to discharge his co-trustee and to appoint 
another in his stead; the trustees enjoyed an unfettered discretion to 
deal with the trust income and capital as they saw fit; and the 
defendant received remuneration for the performance of his duties 
as trustee.
55
 As far as the manner of trust administration was 
concerned, the Court noted that the defendant blatantly ignored the 
joint-action rule because he seldom sought the approval of his co-
trustee for actions performed on behalf of the trust; he listed trust 
assets as his own in a credit application; he insured a beach 
cottage—a trust asset—in his own name; and the trust financed a 
fixed property owned by the defendant.
56
 The Court concluded that 
the foregoing had the cumulative effect of placing the defendant 
“in full control of the trust,”57 which, in the Court’s opinion, 
justified the addition of the trust asset value to that of the 
defendant’s personal estate.58 The Court ordered, therefore, that the 
defendant had to make a redistribution payment of ZAR 1,25 
million to the appellant. The Court arrived at this amount by taking 
into account the net asset values of the parties’ respective estates as 
well as the trust asset value, and by calculating a percentage that it 
considered a just and equitable reflection of the appellant’s 
contribution to the defendant’s estate.59 
                                                                                                             
 54. Id. In Brunette v. Brunette and Another NO 2009 (5) SA 81 (SE) the 
Court concurred when it said that “the manner in which the trusts had been 
administered in the past becomes highly relevant in determining whether or 
not . . . assets [are] to be taken into account in any distribution order in terms of 
§ 7(3) of the Divorce Act”: § 4. See also B v. B [2014] ZAECPEHC 33 (May 29, 
2014) para.26. 
 55. Badenhorst 2006 (2) SA 255 (SCA), para. 10. 
 56. Id. at para. 11. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at para. 13. 
 59. Id. at para. 16. 
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It is interesting to note that the defendant’s personal estate in 
the Badenhorst case was valued at just under ZAR 1,9 million.
60
 
He could, therefore, make the full redistribution payment from his 
personal estate, and there was no need for the Court to find that the 
trust assets in fact vested in him personally and could be used 
toward satisfaction of the appellant’s successful redistribution 
claim. In fact, the appellant in Badenhorst never sought an order 
depriving the trust of its assets; this fact also explains why there 
was no need to join the trust (or its trustees) in Badenhorst in the 
suit.
61
 In Zazeraj NO v. Jordaan and Others,
62
 a follow-up 
judgment to the aforementioned judgment in Jordaan v. Jordaan, 
the Court also confirmed that, in Jordaan v. Jordaan, no finding 
was made that the various trusts’ assets in fact vested in the 
defendant; moreover, that the Jordaan Court’s finding that the 
trusts in question were the alter ego of the defendant did not per se 
imply that the Court regarded these trusts’ assets as the defendant’s 
personal assets.
63
 
The aforementioned considerations may explain why, in the 
subsequent judgment in Van Zyl v. Kaye,
64
 the Court opined that 
the Badenhorst judgment was not a case in which the Court went 
behind the trust form because “[i]t was left to Mr Badenhorst [the 
defendant] to decide how to make payment in terms of the court 
order.”65 The Van Zyl Court ostensibly regarded only the relief that 
culminates in a judgment against a trust or, alternatively, an order 
that trust assets are exigible at the instance of the party in whose 
favor the order is granted, as instances of going behind the trust 
                                                                                                             
 60. Id. at para. 4. 
 61. See also Pringle v. Pringle [2009] ZAWCHC 207 (March 27, 2009), para. 
6. 
 62. Zazeraj NO v. Jordaan and Others [2012] ZAWCHC 120 (March 22, 
2012). 
 63. Id. at para. 19. See also Pringle, [2009] ZAWCHC 207 (March 27, 2009), 
para. 6. See further Van Greune NO and Another v. Van Greune, In re: Van 
Greune v. Van Greune and Others [2013] ZAGPPHC 291 (October 14, 2013). 
 64. Van Zyl and Another NNO v. Kaye NO and Others 2014 (4) SA 452 
(WCC). 
 65. Id. at para. 24. 
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form.
66
 However, as pointed out earlier,
67
 the Van Zyl Court also 
emphasized that trustees’ unconscionable abuse of the trust is 
foundational to South African courts’ power to grant apposite 
relief by going behind the trust form.
68
 In this light, the Van Zyl 
Court conceded that its assessment of the Badenhorst case may be 
incorrect, and that the Badenhorst judgment can be construed as 
one where the Court granted the relief sought by reason of the 
defendant’s opportunistic resort to the existence of the trust as an 
unconscionable means to evade the obligations attendant on the 
dissolution of his marriage.
69
 
The foregoing begs the question of whether it is within the 
competence of a South African court, when it makes a 
redistribution order in terms of Section 7(3) of the Divorce Act, to 
include therein a directive that the assets of an alter ego trust be 
used in satisfaction of the successful redistribution claim. Can a 
court, in other words, order that, by reason of a trustee-spouse’s 
abuse of a trust, the assets of that alter ego trust in fact vest in the 
trustee-spouse personally and can be used to meet the other 
spouse’s redistribution claim? The Supreme Court of Appeal’s 
initial view on going behind the trust form in Land and 
Agricultural Bank of South Africa v. Parker suggests an 
affirmative answer to this question. The Court said that trustees’ 
conduct may invite the inference that “the trust form was a mere 
cover for the conduct of business ‘as before’, and that the assets 
allegedly vesting in trustees in fact belong to one or more of the 
trustees.”70 However, in Van Zyl v. Kaye the Court opined that, 
                                                                                                             
 66. Id. 
 67. See supra Part III. 
 68. Van Zyl, 2014 (4) SA 452 (WCC), para. 22. 
 69. Id. at para. 24. Also, see generally Eben Nel, An Interpretive Account of 
Unconscionability in Trust Law, 35 OBITER 81 (2014). 
 70. Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v. Parker and Others 2005 
(2) SA 77 (SCA), para. 37.3. See also, e.g., First Rand Limited trading inter alia 
as First National Bank v. Britz and Others [2011] ZAGPPHC 119 (July 20, 2011) 
where the Court, in a judgment on alter ego trusts (though not in the context of a 
redistribution order under the Divorce Act), ruled that, by virtue of trustees’ 
excessive and comprehensive control over two trusts, these trusts’ assets indeed 
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where a trust was validly created and continued its existence as 
such, trustees’ maladministration of the assets vested in such a 
properly-constituted trust cannot sustain an averment that the 
assets no longer vest in the trust’s trustees officially, but vest in 
them personally; such an averment is, according to the Van Zyl 
Court, sustainable only upon proof that the trust in question is a 
sham.
71
 It is, in this light, unsurprising that the Supreme Court of 
Appeal in WT v. KT
72
 rendered a judgment, discussed in greater 
detail below,
73
 in which it expressed doubt as to whether even the 
wide discretion bestowed on courts by Section 7(3) of the Divorce 
Act permits a court, when going behind the trust form in giving a 
redistribution order, to rule that trust assets in fact vest in a trustee-
spouse’s personal estate, rather than merely to include the trust 
asset value into that of the trustee-spouse’s personal estate.74 A 
ruling that trust assets in fact vest in the personal estate of a 
trustee-spouse is, as stated in the Van Zyl case, efficient only upon 
a finding that the trust at hand is a sham. 
It is, in light of the foregoing, instructive to note that at least 
one South African commentator has viewed the Badenhorst 
judgment as one in which the Court indeed regarded the trust in 
question as a sham.
75
 However, South African legal scholarship
76
 
and jurisprudence
77
 subsequently confirmed that a trust such as the 
one in the Badenhorst case is not a sham—it is a validly-
constituted trust, but one in respect of which the trustees (or, in 
Badenhorst, the defendant as the dominant co-trustee) 
                                                                                                             
 
vested in the trustees personally. The Court ordered, consequently, that the trust 
assets could be attached in satisfaction of a judgment debt against the two 
trustees in their personal capacities: para. 69. 
 71. Van Zyl, 2014 (4) SA 452 (WCC), para.18. 
 72. WT and Others v. KT 2015 (3) SA 574 (SCA). 
 73. See infra Part IV. C. 
 74. WT, 2015 (3) SA 574 (SCA), para.36. 
 75. Harry Joffe, “Sham” Trusts, DE REBUS 25, 26 (January/February 2007). 
 76. de Waal, supra note 31, at 1086. 
 77. Van Heerden v. Van Heerden and Others [2011] ZAWCHC 209 (May 4, 
2011), § 9. See also generally Van Zyl, 2014 (4) SA 452 (WCC). 
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unconscionably abused the trust through non-adherence to some of 
the basic principles or core duties of trust administration. In the 
Badenhorst case, the defendant’s failure to adhere to the 
fundamentals of trust administration, particularly the joint-action 
rule, and, thereby, his treatment of the trust as his alter ego, 
justified the Court order regarding the addition of the asset value of 
the trust to that of his personal estate for the purpose of making the 
redistribution order. It is, therefore, beyond cavil that a trust needs 
not be declared a sham in order for its asset value to be included in 
a court’s valuation of a party’s estate for the purpose of making a 
redistribution order.
78
 
South African cases on point also show that the purpose for 
which a trust was created is, although not irrelevant, not 
necessarily determinative to a court ruling on the inclusion of the 
asset value of such a trust in a spouse’s personal estate for the 
purpose of making a redistribution order. In Badenhorst, for 
example, the trust at issue was created in order to protect the 
spouses against creditors as well as to curb the payment of 
inheritance tax
79—quite legitimate purposes on its face. In Jordaan 
v. Jordaan,
80
 by contrast, the defendant (the husband) admitted to 
create one of the trusts in question shortly after the commencement 
of the divorce proceedings as part of a fraudulent scheme to 
obscure assets from the plaintiff (his wife).
81
 The Badenhorst and 
Jordaan courts both acceded to the respective prayers to add the 
relevant trusts’ asset values to the values of the relevant parties’ 
personal estates, and did so notwithstanding the fact that, in the 
former case, the trust in question was established for legitimate 
purposes, whereas, in the latter case, the trust was set up to achieve 
a distinctly unlawful purpose. However, in Maritz v. Maritz
82
 the 
                                                                                                             
 78. See also Childs v. Childs and Others NNO 2003 (3) SA 138 (C) 146E. 
The sham-trust issue is discussed further and in greater detail in Part IV. B. 
 79. Badenhorst v. Badenhorst 2006 (2) SA 255 (SCA), para. 4. 
 80. Jordaan v. Jordaan 2001 (3) SA 288 (C). 
 81. Id. at para. 17.6. 
 82. Maritz v. Maritz [2006] JOL 16569 (T). 
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Court expressly distinguished the Jordaan case from the one at 
hand, and did so, inter alia, on the basis that, in Maritz, the 
plaintiff (against whom the defendant sought a redistribution order 
that encompassed also the asset value of an inter vivos trust of 
which the plaintiff and defendant were the co-trustees) did not 
exhibit any of the “dishonest and mean attributes” exhibited by the 
defendant in the Jordaan case.
83
 The defendant’s prayer for the 
inclusion of the trust asset value in the plaintiff’s personal estate 
value for the purpose of making a redistribution order in the Maritz 
case proved unsuccessful.
84
 The Maritz judgment therefore 
underscores the fact that the purpose of the trust(s) in question is 
not wholly irrelevant to the courts’ adjudication on the 
consideration of trust asset values in redistribution claims. 
Maritz v. Maritz evinced another feature that distinguishes it 
from the earlier judgment in Badenhorst v. Badenhorst. It was 
shown above that the Supreme Court of Appeal in Badenhorst paid 
particular attention to evidence that indicated how the defendant 
treated trust assets as if they were his own when he conducted his 
personal business or financial affairs. In Maritz, on the other hand, 
the Court was on the alert that the trustees maintained the trust’s 
financial records and annual financial statements separate from 
those of the plaintiff. Moreover, the trust’s financial statements 
were prepared by an auditor and examples of these served before 
the Court. The plaintiff’s separate financial statements also served 
before the Court. The Court could, therefore, scrutinize both sets of 
documents. These documents indicated, inter alia, that the trust 
and the plaintiff were assessed separately for income tax 
purposes.
85
 The Court also observed that each instance where the 
plaintiff advanced money to the trust and, conversely, where the 
trust advanced money to the plaintiff was reflected separately in 
the relevant financial statements. Moreover, movements on these 
                                                                                                             
 83. Id. at paras. 18–19. 
 84. Id. at para. 22. 
 85. Id. at para. 16. 
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loan accounts were supported by relevant documents and 
explanations. In this light, the Court could not be persuaded that 
the manner in which the plaintiff dealt with the trust assets in his 
capacity as trustee justified a finding that the trust was his alter ego 
and that the value of the trust assets had to be considered toward 
determining the value of his personal estate.
86
 However, a trustee’s 
separation of the financial dealings of a trust from his or her 
personal financial affairs will not necessarily ensure the exclusion 
of the trust asset value from consideration additional to the value 
of the trustee’s personal estate for the purpose of making a 
redistribution order. In Pienaar v. Pienaar and Another,
87
 for 
example, the plaintiff contended that the asset value of a trust, of 
which the defendant was the co-dominant trustee, had to be 
included in the value of the defendant’s personal estate for the 
purpose of effecting a redistribution of assets. The Court 
acknowledged that, despite the fact that a separate bank account 
was opened and operated for the trust, the defendant nevertheless 
treated the principal trust asset, a farm, as well as the rentals 
received in respect thereof, as his own. The Court ruled, 
consequently, that the farm’s value had to be added to the value of 
the defendant’s personal estate for the purpose of making a 
redistribution order.
88
 
The foregoing analysis shows that claims regarding the 
consideration of trust assets toward the granting of redistribution 
orders in divorce proceedings have posed various challenges to 
South African courts in the recent past. South African courts have 
responded to these challenges in a fairly principled and consistent 
manner. Any divergences between judgments on the matter can be 
explained by the factual peculiarities of the cases at hand. Are 
similar trends evident from South African courts’ engagement with 
                                                                                                             
 86. Id. at para. 17. 
 87. Pienaar v. Pienaar and Another [2005] ZAWCHC 123 (January 1, 
2005). 
 88. Id. at para. 44. 
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claims regarding the consideration of trust assets for the purpose of 
realizing accrual claims in divorce proceedings? This question is 
addressed in the next Part of the article. 
B. Accrual Claims 
The first South African judgments regarding the consideration 
of trust assets toward the realization of accrual claims were handed 
down around the same time that jurisprudence emerged on claims 
regarding the consideration of trust assets toward the issuing of 
redistribution orders.
89
 In Pringle v. Pringle,
90
 for example, the 
plaintiff in a matrimonial dispute asked the Court to consider the 
assets of an inter vivos trust, of which her husband, the defendant, 
was the sole trustee, for the purpose of realizing her accrual claim 
against the defendant. She contended that the principles enunciated 
and applied in the Jordaan and Badenhorst cases with regard to the 
treatment of alter ego trusts under the Divorce Act’s redistribution 
dispensation applied mutatis mutandis to the Matrimonial Property 
Act’s accrual dispensation.91 
The Pringle Court saw no reason in principle why trust assets 
may not in appropriate circumstances be taken into account in the 
assessment of the accrual of spouses’ estates upon the dissolution 
of their marriage.
92
 The Court emphasized, moreover, that in casu 
the plaintiff did not seek an order divesting the trust of its assets; 
the plaintiff merely prayed that the trust asset value had to be 
considered toward the determination of the accrual of the 
defendant’s estate. The Court opined that, consequently, the trust 
did not have to be joined in the suit.
93
 The Court granted the 
plaintiff’s prayer, and did so with particular reference to the de 
facto control that the defendant exercised over the trust in his 
                                                                                                             
 89. Smith v. Smith and Another SECLD case No. 619/2006 was one of the 
first unreported judgments on point. 
 90. Pringle v. Pringle [2009] ZAWCHC 207 (March 27, 2009). 
 91. Id. at para. 1. 
 92. Id. at para. 2. 
 93. Id. at para. 8. 
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capacity of trustee.
94
 It is instructive to note that the Court in 
Pringle, like the Court in Jordaan v. Jordaan before it,
95
 
distinguished the Divorce Act’s stipulations on the redistribution of 
assets on the one hand, from the Matrimonial Property Act’s 
directives regarding accrual claims on the other hand. The Court 
said that, whereas Section 7(3) of the Divorce Act endows a court 
with a discretion to issue a redistribution order that is just and 
equitable, no such discretion is conferred by Section 3(1) of the 
Matrimonial Property Act—under the latter provision the extent of 
an accrual claim is strictly a mathematical calculation in 
accordance with the formula prescribed by the Matrimonial 
Property Act.
96
 The Pringle Court did not, however, view this 
difference as a bar to the application of the principles formulated 
and applied in the Jordaan and Badenhorst cases to the 
Matrimonial Property Act’s accrual dispensation.97 
The trend of considering trust assets in accrual claims 
continued in BC v. CC and Others.
98
 However, aspects of this 
                                                                                                             
 94. Id. at para. 17. 
 95. See supra Part IV. A. 
 96. See supra Part II on the formula applicable to the calculation of accrual. 
 97. Pringle, [2009] ZAWCHC 207 (March 27, 2009), para. 2. In AM v. JM 
[2010] ZAWCHC 226 (December 10, 2010) the Court subsequently 
acknowledged the Pringle judgment, particularly its affirmation that the 
principles laid down in the Jordaan and Badenhorst cases can be invoked for the 
purpose of including a trust’s asset value in the determination of the extent of an 
accrual claim upon the dissolution of a marriage. In AM v. JM the Court 
followed suit and ordered that the asset value of an inter vivos trust of which the 
defendant was the dominant co-trustee had to be taken into account in the 
determination of the defendant’s estate accrual. The Court did so by reason of 
copious evidence that the defendant did not deal with the trust “at arm’s length” 
but was, from the trust’s inception, in sole and absolute control of its affairs: 
paras. 17–18. In K v. K [2014] ZAGPPHC 242 (March 7, 2014), on the other 
hand, the Court denied the defendant’s counterclaim for the addition of two inter 
vivos trusts’ asset values to the plaintiff’s personal estate value for the purpose 
of determining the accrual of that estate. The Court did so because the evidence 
adduced did not support the defendant’s averment that the trusts in question 
were in fact the plaintiff’s alter ego. The Court, in arriving at this conclusion, 
distinguished the facts of the Badenhorst case from the facts of the case before it 
and, therefore, did not make a finding on the applicability of the Badenhorst 
case to the consideration of the asset values of trusts in accrual claims: paras. 
34–35. 
 98. BC v. CC and Others 2012 (5) SA 562 (ECP). 
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particular judgment are perplexing. In casu the plaintiff instituted 
divorce proceedings against the first defendant to whom she was 
married out of community of property but subject to the accrual 
system. She sought an order directing, inter alia, that the value of 
assets held by an inter vivos trust, of which the first defendant was 
both the settlor as well as the dominant co-trustee, be taken into 
consideration in determining the accrual of his estate for the 
purpose of her accrual claim under the Matrimonial Property Act. 
The plaintiff alleged in support of this prayer that the first 
defendant was in full control of the trust and of the acquisition, 
management and sale of trust assets.
99
 The first defendant 
countered by pleading in limine that the plaintiff’s particulars of 
claim were deficient for three reasons: it conflicted with Section 12 
of the Trust Property Control Act regarding the separateness of a 
trust estate in a trustee’s hands;100 the Matrimonial Property Act 
does not vest a court with any discretion to include assets other 
than a spouse’s personal assets in the determination of the accrual 
of such a spouse’s estate; and the plaintiff failed to plead that the 
trust had to be set aside, or that the trust assets were in fact the first 
defendant’s property or had to be deemed as such.101 The first 
defendant contended that, consequently, the trust assets could not 
be considered for the purpose of ascertaining the accrual of his 
personal estate. He argued in particular that, given the 
aforementioned absence under the Matrimonial Property Act of a 
judicial discretion commensurate to that under the Divorce Act’s 
redistribution dispensation to ensure that a divorce yields a just and 
equitable pecuniary outcome, the court is not permitted to interfere 
with the spouses’ contractual rights regarding accrual as 
determined by their pre-nuptial contract.
102
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The Court, in addressing the aforementioned arguments 
proffered by the first defendant, acknowledged the directive in 
Section 12 of the Trust Property Control Act, but opined that the 
said directive is inapplicable where a sham trust is at hand. Where, 
therefore, the parties who ostensibly set up a “trust” never intended 
the formation of a trust, or never intended for the so-called trustees 
to hold the supposed trust assets for the would-be trust 
beneficiaries, no trust would come into existence and the assets of 
the “trust” would remain the de facto property of either the 
supposed settlor or the beneficial owner of the particular assets. 
The Court opined that, in such a case, the simulated creation of the 
“trust” could be set aside, and the settlor or beneficial owner would 
then be identified as the true owner of the assets concerned—if the 
settlor or beneficial owner is a spouse to a marriage subject to the 
accrual system, the supposed trust assets will indeed constitute 
assets in that spouse’s personal estate.103 The Court opined, 
furthermore, that the consideration of the asset value of a trust 
toward determining the accrual of a spouse’s estate under the 
Matrimonial Property Act does not amount to the exercise of a 
discretion—it entails a factual inquiry similar to the one conducted 
for the purpose of the inclusion of a trust’s asset value toward 
determining the extent of a spouse’s redistribution claim under the 
Divorce Act. The Court, therefore, disagreed with the defendants’ 
contention that, unlike redistribution claims, accrual claims do not 
warrant consideration of trust assets.
104
 The Court opined, finally, 
that, if the plaintiff’s allegations were shown to be correct, the 
plaintiff would succeed in proving that the assets ostensibly owned 
by the trust, or some of those assets, were de facto the 
first defendant’s property, and, therefore, that their value ought to 
be taken into account in determining the extent to which the first 
defendant’s estate accrued stante matrimonio. The Court ruled that 
the plaintiff’s failure to plead specifically that such assets be 
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deemed to be the first defendant’s assets was not fatal to the 
plaintiff’s case.105 The Court consequently dismissed the points of 
law that the defendants raised in limine.
106
 
Whilst the judgment in BC v. CC provides further affirmation 
for the consideration of trust assets in accrual claims, the basis 
upon which the Court was willing to do so in casu is not altogether 
clear. The Court seems to suggest, on the one hand, that such 
consideration is appropriate where the “trust” at hand is a sham 
and the supposed trust assets are in fact the property of the party 
who actually derives benefit therefrom.
107
 On the other hand, the 
Court considered judgments, including the Jordaan and 
Badenhorst cases, which it typified as cases where “[t]he courts 
have in the past identified beneficial owners as the true owners of 
trust assets in matrimonial cases.”108 A scenario in which the 
beneficial owner of trust assets is in fact the true owner of those 
assets is certainly evocative of the state of affairs under a sham 
trust.
109
 However, it was pointed out earlier
110
 that the trusts in the 
                                                                                                             
 105. Id. at para. 18. 
 106. Id. at para. 19. 
 107. Id. at para. 8. 
 108. Id. at para. 10. 
 109. de Waal, supra note 31, observes that, in the sham-trust scenario where 
the parties to a simulated creation of a trust lacked the actual intention to 
establish a trust but rather intended to benefit the recipient of the “trust assets,” 
the supposed trust is disregarded and the recipient acquires the assets in his or 
her personal capacity free from any burden to hold it on trust: at 1096–1097. 
Similarly, in Van Zyl and Another NNO v. Kaye NO and Others 2014 (4) SA 
452 (WCC), the applicants, the provisional trustees in the insolvent estate of 
Kaye, applied for an order that an immovable property held in trust was in fact 
an asset in Kaye’s insolvent estate. They averred that the trust was Kaye’s alter 
ego, and they urged the Court to go behind the trust form by ordering that the 
immovable property formed part of Kaye’s insolvent estate. The Court 
dismissed the application on the ground that the relief sought by the applicants 
was misconceived. Binns-Ward J. said that the applicants’ objective was to have 
a mortgage over the particular immovable property set aside, and that that 
objective could be achieved only if they could show that the immovable 
property was not a trust asset but rather an asset in Kaye’s personal estate. 
According to Binns-Ward J. only proof that the trust was a sham would yield 
such a result because then the trustees would not have acquired the immovable 
property for the trust but rather as Kaye’s agents, which, in turn, would occasion 
the property to form part of the principal’s (Kaye’s) personal estate. Binns-Ward 
J. was adamant, however, that Kaye’s treatment of the trust as his alter ego did 
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Jordaan and Badenhorst cases were not sham trusts—they were 
validly-constituted trusts whose trustees abused the trusts through 
non-adherence to the fundamentals of trust administration. It was 
also pointed out earlier
111
 that the Jordaan and Badenhorst courts 
did not rule that the respective trustees in fact personally owned 
the assets of the trusts in question; instead, the two courts regarded 
the trusts at hand as genuine trusts (with the respective trustees as 
the owners of trust assets qua trustees) but, by reason of the 
trustees’ unconscionable treatment of those trusts as their alter ego, 
the Jordaan and Badenhorst courts went behind the trust form 
through consideration of the trust asset values for purposes of 
making redistribution orders. 
It is submitted, therefore, that the Court in BC v. CC fell prey 
to the very danger against which the Court in Van Zyl v. Kaye 
cautioned,
112
 namely an unwholesome conflation of the law 
pertaining to sham trusts on the one hand, and alter ego trusts on 
the other hand. This conflation is, arguably, most evident when 
Dambuza J., who delivered the BC judgment, stated: 
[I]f the plaintiff’s allegations are proved to be correct, the 
plaintiff will have succeeded in proving that the assets 
ostensibly owned by the trust, or some of them, are de facto 
the property of the first defendant . . . .The fact that the 
plaintiff has not pleaded specifically that such assets be 
deemed to be the assets of the plaintiff
113
 is not . . . fatal to 
the plaintiff’s case in the light of the allegation that such 
assets are under de facto ownership of the first defendant 
and that the trust is his alter ego.
114
 
                                                                                                             
 
not render the trust a sham and, therefore, that going behind the trust form could 
not yield the outcome that the applicants desired: paras. 15, 29. 
 110. See supra Part IV. A. 
 111. Id. 
 112. See supra Part III. 
 113. This is apparently an erroneous reference to the plaintiff—the Court 
should have referred to the first defendant. 
 114. BC v. CC and Others 2012 (5) SA 562 (ECP), para. 18 (emphasis 
added). 
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It must be reiterated that, when assets are deemed to be the 
personal assets of a trustee because that trustee is the de facto 
owner of those assets (in the sense that the trustee—and not the 
trust beneficiaries—was intended all along as the beneficial owner 
of those assets), the “trust” at hand, contrary to the Court in BC v. 
CC’s above standpoint, is not an alter ego trust, but may well be a 
sham trust. It is clear, therefore, that aspects of the judgment in BC 
v. CC are open to criticism by reason of the Court’s ostensible 
conflation of the law pertaining to sham trusts with that regarding 
alter ego trusts. The judgment nevertheless extended the earlier 
series of cases in which South African courts were favorably 
disposed toward considering trust assets in the assessment of 
accrual claims. The subsequent judgment in MM and Others v. 
JM
115
 questioned the legal foundation upon which this series of 
cases rested. 
In MM v. JM the plaintiff instituted divorce proceedings 
against the first defendant who, in a claim in reconvention, sought 
an order for an accrual payment in accordance with their 
matrimonial property regime. The principal issue before the Court 
was whether the asset value of an inter vivos trust, of which the 
plaintiff was the settlor and the dominant co-trustee, could be taken 
into account toward establishing the accrual of the plaintiff’s 
estate. The defendant pleaded that the trust was the plaintiff’s alter 
ego and that, consequently, its assets should be considered 
alongside his personal assets for the purpose of determining the 
accrual of his estate. She did not, however, aver that the plaintiff 
was in fact the beneficial owner of the trust assets, nor did she 
maintain that the trust was a sham. Her case was that the trust 
assets had to be taken into account toward determining the accrual 
of the plaintiff’s estate because he had the power and the ability to 
use those assets for his sole benefit.
116
 The defendant sought 
                                                                                                             
 115. MM and Others v. JM 2014 (4) SA 384 (KZP). 
 116. Id. at paras. 4, 6. 
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support for this contention in the judgments, discussed earlier,
117
 in 
which trust assets were considered toward effecting the 
redistribution of assets in terms of the Divorce Act.
118
 
The Court in MM, unlike its predecessor in BC, regarded a 
redistribution order in terms of the Divorce Act as fundamentally 
different from an accrual claim in terms of the Matrimonial 
Property Act in that, in the former instance, a court is required to 
make a discretionary assessment of what it deems just, whereas no 
such assessment is made in the latter instance in terms of the strict 
mathematical calculation of accrual prescribed by the Matrimonial 
Property Act.
119
 The Court opined, therefore, that a judgment such 
as Badenhorst on the redistribution of assets provides no authority 
for the proposition that trust assets can be considered toward 
determining the accrual of the estate of one spouse for the purpose 
of realizing the other spouse’s accrual claim.120 The Court in MM 
questioned, moreover, the BC Court’s view that the determination 
of which assets are to be so considered is the same for purposes of 
the Divorce Act and the Matrimonial Property Act. The MM Court 
evidently viewed the absence of a judicial discretion regarding the 
calculation of accrual claims under the latter Act as an absolute bar 
to any equation of the two instances.
121
 The MM Court concluded, 
therefore, that the defendant’s claim in reconvention was invalid 
because the Matrimonial Property Act reveals no legal basis for an 
order that trust assets, which do not form part of one spouse’s 
personal estate could, on the ground of justness, be deemed to form 
part of it for purposes of determining the accrual of that spouse’s 
estate.
122
 
The judgment in MM v. JM, being at odds with its predecessors 
in Pringle and BC, certainly complicated the topic under 
                                                                                                             
 117. See supra Part IV. A. 
 118. MM 2014 (4) SA 384 (KZP), paras. 7–11. 
 119. Id. at paras. 12, 19. 
 120. Id. at para. 13. 
 121. Id. at paras. 17, 19. 
 122. Id. at paras. 19–20. 
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discussion. RP v. DP and Others
123
 subsequently amplified this 
complexity through its affirmation of the correctness of the BC 
judgment and, by implication, its opposition to the MM 
judgment.
124
 However, aspects of the RP judgment are as 
perplexing as those aspects of the BC judgment highlighted earlier. 
RP concerned a matrimonial dispute between the applicant (the 
wife) and the first defendant (the husband). The first defendant had 
earlier instituted divorce proceedings against the applicant, and the 
applicant, in a counterclaim, had prayed an accrual payment from 
him in accordance with their matrimonial property regime. The 
applicant, in the application proceedings before the Court in RP v. 
DP, prayed the joinder of an inter vivos trust’s trustees to the suit 
and asked, furthermore, that the asset value of said trust be 
considered toward establishing the value of the first defendant’s 
estate for the purpose of her accrual claim. She contended that, 
from the trust’s inception, the first defendant was, as the dominant 
co-trustee, in de facto control of its assets and that he used the trust 
as a vehicle to accumulate wealth for his personal benefit. The 
applicant averred, therefore, that the trust was the first defendant’s 
alter ego and, had the trust not been created, all its assets would 
have vested in the first defendant personally.
125
 The defendants 
(the trustees of the trust) opposed the application and argued that, 
since the applicant did not seek to divest the trust of ownership of 
its assets or to effect transfer of any of the trust assets to herself or 
to the first defendant, the trust had no substantial interest in the 
relief claimed and, therefore, should not be joined in the suit.
126
 In 
regard to the applicant’s prayer that the value of the trust assets be 
considered toward establishing the accrual of the first defendant’s 
                                                                                                             
 123. RP v. DP and Others 2014 (6) SA 243 (ECP). 
 124. It must be noted that the judgment in RP v. DP was handed down in the 
same division of the High Court as the earlier judgment in BC v. CC and, 
therefore, in accordance with the doctrine of stare decisis (or legal precedent), 
the particular High Court was bound by its own previous judgment. 
 125. RP, 2014 (6) SA 243 (ECP), paras. 6–8. 
 126. Id. at paras. 10, 12. 
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estate, the first defendant contended that, while such a 
consideration may be appropriate in the context of the Divorce 
Act’s discretionary redistribution dispensation, the Matrimonial 
Property Act leaves no room for a commensurate judicial 
consideration of the asset value of a trust for the purpose of 
establishing the accrual of a spouse’s estate.127 
The Court, in addressing the first defendant’s contentions, 
acknowledged the separate existence of trust estates in trustees’ 
hands, but also acknowledged that South African courts have in the 
past pierced “the veil which separates the trust assets from the 
personal assets of the trustee.”128 Regrettably, the RP Court 
followed this apt metaphor with a statement that smacks of the BC 
Court’s earlier conflation of the law regarding sham trusts with that 
regarding alter ego trusts in the context of the abuse of the trust 
form. The RP Court said that “[t]his will happen . . . in cases where 
the trust is a sham and for all practical purposes is the alter ego of 
the founder or trustee.”129 This statement, it is submitted, again 
represents an erroneous equation of sham trusts with alter ego 
trusts. The aforementioned conflation is confirmed when the Court 
opined that the personal assets of a trustee will include what is 
notionally regarded as trust assets only through the lifting or 
piercing of the trust veil and, therefore, by a finding that the trust is 
indeed the alter ego of the trustee and that the so-called trust assets 
are assets in the personal estate of the trustee.
130
 It must be 
reiterated at this juncture that, in light of the unequivocal 
pronouncement in Van Zyl v. Kaye referred to earlier,
131
 a trustee’s 
abuse of a trust by treating it as his or her alter ego cannot cause 
trust assets to vest in such a trustee’s personal estate, nor can a 
court go behind the trust form to order such a result. A trustee’s 
personal assets can include what is notionally regarded as trust 
                                                                                                             
 127. Id. at para. 11. 
 128. Id. at para. 21. 
 129. Id. at para. 22. 
 130. Id. at para. 35. 
 131. See supra Part IV. A. 
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assets only when a sham trust is at hand, in which case going 
behind the trust form is, again according to the view espoused in 
Van Zyl v. Kaye,
132
 not an appropriate remedy. 
The Court in RP, ostensibly referring to piercing the trust veil 
in the sense of going behind the trust form, opined further, having 
had regard to the judgment in Badenhorst v. Badenhorst in 
particular, that the power of a court to pierce the trust veil is 
derived from the common law—it is, according to the RP Court, 
consequent upon the evidence placed before the court and not upon 
the exercise of any judicial discretion.
133
 The Court, therefore, 
regarded piercing the veil that separates a trustee’s personal estate 
from the trust estate as a function distinct from, for example, the 
exercise of discretion in making a redistribution order under 
Section 7 of the Divorce Act.
134
 The Court viewed the making of a 
redistribution order as involving two distinct functions: the first is 
a factual determination of “which assets are [a spouse’s] personal 
assets,” whereas the second concerns the calculation of a just and 
equitable redistribution amount. The first function must not, 
according to the Court in RP, “be conflated or confused with the 
second function;”135 moreover, the first function, being non-
discretionary in nature, can apply equally to redistribution claims 
as well as accrual claims. In consequence of this view, the RP 
Court was favorably disposed toward the earlier judgment in BC v. 
CC, particularly the BC Court’s reliance on the Jordaan and 
Badenhorst cases in performing the aforementioned first function, 
namely its finding that the asset value of the alter ego trust could 
be taken into account in determining the extent of the accrual of 
the first defendant’s personal estate in the BC case. 
The RP Court—possibly by reason of its dubious conflation of 
the law pertaining to sham trusts with that pertinent to alter ego 
                                                                                                             
 132. See supra Part III. 
 133. RP, 2014 (6) SA 243 (ECP), paras. 24, 31, 35. 
 134. Id. at para. 31. 
 135. Id. at para. 57. 
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trusts—next opined that, in piercing the trust veil, a court is not 
required to set aside the entire trust as a simulated deed; it is only 
required to set aside those transactions which are proven to be 
simulated.
136
 In fact, Alkema J., who handed down the judgment in 
RP, described the applicant’s claim as follows: 
Her claim, essentially, is that by virtue of first respondent’s 
[defendant’s] abuse of the trust form, many transactions 
resulting in the ostensible acquisition of trust assets held by 
first respondent as trustee allegedly on behalf of the trust, 
are simulated transactions because in truth and in fact 
those assets belong to first respondent and are assets in his 
personal estate and not in the estate of the trust. She 
effectively seeks the simulation to be set aside and claims 
an order that those assets be taken into account as personal 
assets of the first respondent in determining her accrual 
claim.
137
 
Whilst Alkema J.’s above exposition on the effects of setting 
aside simulated transactions is indeed correct, it is arguable that a 
challenge to individual trustee transactions on the ground that they 
were simulations is not typical of going behind the trust form in 
order to curb the abuse of a trust. This much is evident from YB v. 
SB and Others NNO.
138
 In this case the plaintiff instituted divorce 
proceedings against the first defendant to whom she was married 
out of community of property but subject to the accrual system. 
The plaintiff and first defendant were among the co-trustees of an 
inter vivos trust created during the subsistence of their marriage. 
The plaintiff sought to amend her particulars of claim by including 
therein a claim that the trustees simulated the acquisition of trust 
assets and that these simulated transactions had to be set aside to 
acknowledge the first defendant as the de facto beneficial owner of 
the assets. The plaintiff averred that the first defendant and the 
trustees intended at all material times for the first defendant to be 
the beneficial owner of the assets ostensibly held in trust. The 
                                                                                                             
 136. Id. at paras. 47, 48, 53. 
 137. Id. at para. 47. 
 138. YB v. SB and Others NNO 2016 (1) SA 47 (WCC). 
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plaintiff contended, consequently, that the trust assets had to be 
added to the value of the first defendant’s personal estate for the 
purpose of calculating the accrual of said estate in terms of the 
Matrimonial Property Act.
139
 
Riley A.J., in granting the plaintiff’s application to amend her 
particulars of claim, pointed out explicitly that the plaintiff’s 
application was not based on the averment that the trust in issue 
was the first defendant’s alter ego; instead, she plead expressly 
that, from the trust’s inception, the assets ostensibly held in trust 
were acquired through simulated transactions and, therefore, were 
beneficially owned by the first defendant.
140
 Riley A.J. evidently 
regarded a challenge to individual trustee transactions on the 
ground that they were simulations as essentially different from 
going behind the trust form to curb the abuse of a trust in the alter-
ego-trust scenario. This assertion is fortified by the Acting Judge’s 
opinion that, even though the plaintiff’s case in YB v. SB was on all 
fours with Alkema J’s above exposition in RP v. DP on the effects 
of setting aside simulated transactions,
141
 it was, nevertheless, “not 
necessary to become involved in the so-called alter ego 
controversy, as it . . . does not find application.”142 This statement 
supports the contention that the setting aside of individual trustee 
transactions on the ground that they were simulations is not typical 
of going behind the trust form in order to curb the abuse of the 
trust form. The better view, it is submitted, is to address the setting 
aside of trustee transactions on the ground that they were 
simulations in terms of the common-law rules pertinent to 
simulated contracts, particularly the application of the maxim plus 
valet quod agitur quam quod simulate concipitur.
143
 This maxim, 
                                                                                                             
 139. Id. at paras. 2, 5. 
 140. Id. at para. 40. 
 141. Id. at para. 47. 
 142. Id. at para. 51. 
 143. The maxim means that the contracting parties’ real intention carries 
more weight than a fraudulent formation or pretence: see Zandberg v. Van Zyl 
1910 AD 302 309. 
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if invoked successfully, will occasion the discarding of any 
simulated transactions for the supposed acquisition of trust assets, 
and will ensure that effect is given to the contracting parties’ true 
intention, namely that the assets acquired under the guise of 
trusteeship actually vest in its beneficial owner’s personal estate. It 
follows from the foregoing that the RP Court’s engagement with 
going behind the trust form in the context of accrual claims is, 
unfortunately, not a model of conceptual clarity. 
The Court in RP v. DP ruled in the end that the trustees of the 
inter vivos trust in question had a real and substantial interest in the 
applicant’s claim, and, accordingly, that they should be joined as 
parties to the action. The Court also found that the prayer for the 
proposed amendment of the applicant’s particulars of claim to 
reflect the joinder as well as the claim that certain trust assets 
should be considered as assets in the personal estate of the first 
defendant should be granted.
144
 
The foregoing analysis shows that prayers regarding the 
consideration of trust assets toward the realization of accrual 
claims in divorce proceedings have also posed challenges to South 
African courts in the recent past. South African courts’ responses 
to these challenges have been more varied than their engagement 
with the consideration of trust assets toward the issuing of 
redistribution orders in divorce proceedings. The judgment in MM 
v. JM in particular threw the proverbial cat amongst the pigeons 
insofar as it, unlike other judgments on point, espoused a 
fundamentally different view on the legal rules applicable to the 
treatment of alter ego trusts under the Divorce Act’s redistribution 
dispensation compared to the legal rules apposite to the 
Matrimonial Property Act’s accrual dispensation. A prima facie 
resolution to this matter has since been provided by the Supreme 
Court of Appeal in a judgment on the addition of trust assets to a 
                                                                                                             
 144. RP v. DP and Others 2014 (6) SA 243 (ECP), para. 58. See also M v. M 
[2015] ZAGPPHC 66 (February 4, 2015) for another judgment that yielded an 
outcome similar to that in RP v. DP. 
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joint estate where the spouses were married in community of 
property. This judgment is considered in the next part of the 
article. 
C. Trust Assets and Joint Estates 
While judgments abound on the addition of trust asset values to 
those of trustee-spouses’ personal estates under the Divorce Act’s 
redistribution dispensation and the Matrimonial Property Act’s 
accrual dispensation, only two South African judgments have, at 
the time of writing, been handed down on the consideration of trust 
assets with regard to a joint estate where a marriage was concluded 
in community of property. Moreover, the two judgments were that 
of the court of first instance and, subsequently, that of the Supreme 
Court of Appeal in the same case. A comparison between the lower 
court’s standpoint on the one hand, and that of the appeal court on 
the other hand, in this matter is instructive for two reasons: first, it 
ostensibly settled the legal position with regard to the (potential) 
consideration of trust assets as part of a joint estate; and, secondly, 
it also seemingly answered (albeit indirectly) the question of 
whether the BC and RP Courts’ stance, or that of the MM Court, to 
the treatment of alter ego trusts under the Matrimonial Property 
Act’s accrual dispensation is to be preferred. 
In T v. T
145
 the plaintiff (the husband) and defendant (the wife) 
cohabitated for approximately four years prior to marrying, and did 
so for the two years preceding their marriage in a home acquired 
by a trust of which the plaintiff was a co-trustee. The parties 
subsequently married in community of property, which marriage 
had broken down irretrievably when the spouses separated 
approximately eight years later. The plaintiff thereafter instituted 
divorce proceedings against the defendant. The defendant did not 
oppose the decree of divorce sought by the plaintiff, but she 
instituted a counterclaim relating to the extent of the assets in the 
                                                                                                             
 145. T v. T [2014] ZAGPJHC 245 (September 19, 2014). 
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spouses’ joint estate. The defendant averred, inter alia, that the 
aforementioned trust assets, principally the matrimonial home, had 
to be included in the joint estate because the plaintiff de facto 
controlled the trust to amass his own wealth; moreover, the 
argument was made that but for the trust, he would have acquired 
the trust assets in his own name—in other words, she averred that 
the trust was no more than her husband’s alter ego.146 
The Court commenced its engagement with the defendant’s 
averments by stating that, in order to ascertain whether the trust 
“fell into the joint estate” it had to determine whether or not the 
trust “is in fact the alter ego of the plaintiff and so is an asset which 
is his.”147 The Court’s starting point, like that of the Court in RP v. 
DP,
148
 appears to be premised on the supposition that a trustee’s 
treatment of a trust as his or her alter ego, and the abuse of the trust 
form consequent upon such treatment, occasions the trust assets to 
vest in such a trustee personally and, in the instance of a marriage 
in community of property, thereby to form part of the spouses’ 
joint estate. It must again be emphasized at this point that such a 
supposition runs contrary to the pronouncement in Van Zyl v. 
Kaye, highlighted earlier,
149
 that a trustee’s abuse of a trust through 
his or her non-adherence to the fundamentals of trust 
administration is in itself insufficient to sustain an averment that 
the trust assets no longer vest in the trustee officially, but that those 
assets vest in him or her personally. Accordingly, the Court in T v. 
T, as was the case with its predecessors in BC v. CC and RP v. DP, 
appears to have erred in its understanding of the consequences that 
attach to a trustee’s treatment of a trust as his or her alter ego. The 
Court compounded its error when it referred expressly to 
Badenhorst v. Badenhorst as an example of those cases in which 
“properties owned by entities other than parties to the marriage 
                                                                                                             
 146. See the exposition on the pleadings in the Supreme Court of Appeal’s 
judgment: WT and Others v. KT 2015 (3) SA 574 (SCA), para. 3. 
 147. T, ZAGPJHC 245 (September 19, 2014), para. 28. 
 148. See supra Part IV. B. 
 149. See supra Part IV. A. 
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have been held to form part of an estate.”150 However, it was 
shown earlier that the appellant in Badenhorst never sought an 
order depriving the trust at issue in that case of its assets, nor 
indeed an order that the assets of the trust formed part of her 
husband’s personal estate.151 Therefore, the Badenhorst case does 
not support the finding that the T Court ascribed to it. 
The Court next addressed the submission, ostensibly made by 
the plaintiff, that judgments such as Badenhorst dealt with the 
Divorce Act’s redistribution dispensation and, therefore, involved 
the exercise of a judicial discretion; because the exercise of a 
commensurate discretion was not at issue in the present matter, so 
the submission proceeded, the principles laid down in Badenhorst 
and corresponding judgments were inapplicable to the present 
case.
152
 Of course, this very argument was also addressed in BC v. 
CC, MM v. JM, and RP v. DP in the context of the addition of trust 
asset values to the values of trustee-spouses’ personal estates under 
the Matrimonial Property Act’s accrual dispensation. The Courts in 
the first- and last-mentioned judgments were unconvinced by this 
submission, whereas the Court in MM agreed fully with it.
153
 
Which view would the Court in T v. T hold? 
Lamont J., who handed down the judgment in T v. T, aligned 
himself with the BC and RP Courts’ standpoint (although without 
express reference to these cases) when he said with regard to the 
judgments relied upon in the above-mentioned submission: 
The flaw in the argument made to me is that in each case it 
was necessary for the court to first determine what the 
assets were which belonged to the party against whom the 
order was to be made. This involved a decision as to how 
big the estate was and what comprised the estate. Once that 
investigation had been taken, a discretion was applied as to 
what the financial consequences of that decision were. 
There was no question of any discretion playing any role in 
                                                                                                             
 150. T, ZAGPJHC 245 (September 19, 2014), para 30. 
 151. See supra Part IV. A. 
 152. T, ZAGPJHC 245 (September 19, 2014), paras. 31–32. 
 153. See supra Part IV. B. 
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the formulation of the test to be applied in establishing 
whether or not assets belonged to a particular party. The 
issue in the present case is identical. The investigation to be 
undertaken is whether or not the assets in the trust are the 
assets of the plaintiff and hence of the joint estate.
154
 
Lamont J.’s foregoing view certainly corresponds to that 
expressed in BC v. CC and RP v. DP, namely that piercing the veil 
that separates a trustee’s personal estate from the trust estate is a 
function distinct from the exercise of any discretion in making a 
redistribution order under Section 7 of the Divorce Act.
155
 As 
indicated earlier,
156
 this view regards the making of a redistribution 
order as involving two distinct functions, the first of which is a 
factual determination of “which assets are [a spouse’s] personal 
assets.”157 This function, being non-discretionary in nature, 
applies, according to the BC and RP judgments, equally to 
redistribution claims as well as accrual claims, and, in light of 
Lamont J.’s ruling in T v. T, also to the inclusion of trust assets in 
the determination of the extent of spouses’ joint estate. In the 
result, the Court in T v. T ordered, in light of copious evidence that 
the plaintiff’s co-trustee was supine to the plaintiff’s control over 
the trust and that the plaintiff manipulated the trust’s affairs to give 
himself unfettered access to the trust funds and assets,
158
 that the 
spouses’ joint estate “includes the assets of the . . . Trust.”159 The 
plaintiff, evidently dissatisfied with this ruling, appealed against 
Lamont J.’s judgment. The appeal was heard by a full bench—five 
judges—of the Supreme Court of Appeal; consequently, the appeal 
judgment, under the citation WT and Others v. KT,
160
 constitutes, 
along with the Badenhorst judgment, the most authoritative 
                                                                                                             
 154. T, ZAGPJHC 245 (September 19, 2014), paras. 33–35. 
 155. See supra Part IV. B. 
 156. Id. 
 157. RP v. DP and Others 2014 (6) SA 243 (ECP), para. 57. 
 158. T, ZAGPJHC 245 (September 19, 2014), para. 37. 
 159. Id. at para. 47. 
 160. WT and Others v. KT 2015 (3) SA 574 (SCA). 
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pronouncement to date on the consideration of trust assets toward 
the determination of the patrimonial consequences of divorce. 
The Supreme Court of Appeal made short work of what it 
regarded as Lamont J.’s reliance on the Badenhorst case in the 
judgment he handed down in the court of first instance. The 
Supreme Court of Appeal regarded this reliance as “misdirected” 
because, in the Court’s opinion, Badenhorst was decided in the 
context of the discretion bestowed by Section 7(3) of the Divorce 
Act toward the making of a redistribution order whereas, in the 
present matter, the court, in assessing the patrimonial 
consequences of the termination of a marriage in community of 
property, is not vested with any commensurate discretion but is 
“confined merely to directing that the assets of the joint estate be 
divided in equal shares.”161 The Court then stated: 
The court concerned with a marriage in community of 
property . . . has no comparable discretion as envisaged in 
s 7(3) of the Divorce Act to include the assets of a third 
party in the joint estate. In any event, s 12 of the [Trust 
Property Control] Act specifically recognizes in this 
context that trust assets held by a trustee in trust, do not 
form part of the personal property of such trustee as a 
matter of law.
162
 
The foregoing statement appears to situate the addition of the 
asset values of alter ego trusts to the values of trustee-spouses’ 
personal estates exclusively within the equitable and discretionary 
dispensation on the redistribution of assets contained in the 
Divorce Act. Moreover, the Supreme Court of Appeal’s statement 
directly and pertinently excludes any possibility of adding the 
assets of an alter ego trust (or their value) to a joint estate where a 
marriage was concluded in community of property; a view that is 
founded on the absence of any judicial discretion to such an end in 
the legal rules that govern the strictly mathematical division of a 
joint estate upon the termination of a marriage in community of 
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property. It is submitted that the Supreme Court of Appeal’s 
statement also indirectly and by analogy excludes the possibility of 
adding the assets (or their value) of an alter ego trust to a trustee-
spouse’s personal estate for the purpose of realizing an accrual 
claim where the spouses married out of community of property 
subject to the accrual system. This submission is premised on the 
same absence of any judicial discretion to such an end in the legal 
rules that govern the strictly mathematical calculation of accrual 
upon the termination of a marriage out of community of property 
to which the accrual system applies. The directive, mentioned 
expressly in the above dictum from WT v. KT, in Section 12 of the 
Trust Property Control Act on the separateness of the trust estate in 
a trustee’s hands lends further weight to this submission. In this 
light, the Supreme Court of Appeal’s stance in the WT judgment 
provides firm support to the judgment on accrual in MM v. JM, 
and, commensurately, appears to vitiate the judgments on point in 
BC v. CC and RP v. DP. 
The Supreme Court of Appeal in WT also exposed the 
erroneous supposition of the court of first instance regarding the 
consequences that attach to a trustee’s treatment of a trust as his or 
her alter ego. The Court opined that Lamont J.’s order in the court 
of first instance amounted to a “transfer of the trust’s assets to the 
joint estate.”163 The Supreme Court of Appeal reasoned—in 
consonance with the view expressed earlier in Van Zyl v. 
Kaye
164—that such a “transfer” in the ownership of trust property 
merely by reason of the abuse of the trust form is legally 
untenable; in fact, the Court expressed doubt as to whether even 
the wide discretion afforded by Section 7(3) of the Divorce Act 
enables a court to effect any “transfer” of ownership in trust assets, 
rather than to merely order the addition of the value of such assets 
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to that of a trustee-spouse’s personal estate when it goes behind the 
trust form in the making of a redistribution order.
165
 
In light of the foregoing considerations, the Supreme Court of 
Appeal upheld the appellant’s appeal, and set aside the order of the 
court of first instance on the inclusion of the trust assets in the 
spouses’ joint estate.166 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The South African experience with trusts and their (possible) 
role in the determination of the patrimonial consequences of 
divorce bring to light many of the unforeseen challenges 
occasioned by the development of a uniquely South African trust 
law through the adaptation of the English-law trust to South 
African law with its strong civilian legal tradition. One such 
challenge relates to the conceptual clarity demanded of judicial 
(and scholarly) engagement with the abuse of the trust form. The 
apparent absence of such clarity in judgments such as BC v. CC, 
RP v. DP and T v. T by reason of these courts’ obfuscation 
regarding the difference between sham trusts and alter ego trusts 
have wrought a great deal of confusion in South African 
jurisprudence on claims to trust assets in divorce proceedings. The 
Supreme Court of Appeal’s judgment in WT v. KT elucidated this 
matter insofar as it exposed the lack of clarity evident from these 
three judgments. The Court in WT v. KT also distinguished 
pertinently between the Divorce Act’s discretionary redistribution 
dispensation with regard to marriages concluded subject to a 
complete separation of property on the one hand, and marriages 
concluded in community of property on the other hand. In the 
former instance, according to the Badenhorst judgment, judicial 
consideration of trust asset values to determine the patrimonial 
consequences of divorce is possible, whereas in the latter instance, 
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according to the WT judgment, considering trust asset values in 
determining the patrimonial consequences of divorce is not 
possible by reason of the absence of a judicial discretion 
comparable to that afforded by the Divorce Act’s redistribution 
dispensation. The latter finding extends, by implication, also to 
marriages concluded out of community of property subject to the 
accrual system because the accrual system is also non-
discretionary in nature.
167
 
It must be noted, however, that the Supreme Court of Appeal 
made no definitive pronouncement in WT v. KT on the view 
espoused in the BC, RP and T judgments that the Divorce Act’s 
redistribution dispensation involves a two-tiered approach insofar 
as it comprises both a non-discretionary element (determining the 
extent or total value of a spouse’s estate) as well as a discretionary 
element (achieving a just patrimonial outcome in the divorce 
proceedings at hand); moreover, that the non-discretionary element 
is transferable onto other matrimonial property regimes. Should 
this view on the redistribution of assets as a segmented process 
prevail in future judgments of South Africa’s highest court, it may 
well (re-)open the door to the consideration of trust assets—as part 
of a factual determination on the extent of a trustee-spouse’s 
estate—in divorce proceedings for spouses married out of 
community of property subject to the accrual system and, possibly, 
even for spouses married in community of property. A close 
reading of the Badenhorst judgment appears to support this view in 
that the Court first addressed the question of whether the trust at 
issue in casu was indeed abused, which, if answered in the 
affirmative, would warrant a consideration of the trust asset value 
in the determination of the extent of the defendant’s personal estate 
value. The Court invoked the “but for”-test to this end. Combrinck 
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A.J.A., who handed down the Badenhorst judgment, said: “To 
succeed in a claim that trust assets be included in the estate of one 
of the parties to a marriage there needs to be evidence that such 
party controlled the trust and but for the trust would have acquired 
and owned the assets in his own name.”168 
The evidence adduced by the appellant in Badenhorst satisfied 
the Court that the defendant’s abuse of the trust justified the 
addition of the trust asset value to that of his personal estate. Only 
thereafter did the Court proceed to determine the redistribution 
amount payable by the defendant, and did so with express 
reference to the equitable considerations that underpin the Divorce 
Act’s redistribution dispensation. Combrinck A.J.A. said: 
[I]n my judgment an equitable result will be achieved, and 
recognition given to the appellant’s contribution to the 
maintenance and increase of the respondent’s estate, by 
ordering him to pay to the appellant the sum of R1 250 000. 
This amount is arrived at by taking the total of the net asset 
value of the parties’ estates and that of the trust,169 
calculating a percentage which is considered just and 
equitable for appellant’s contribution170 and deducting what 
she already stands possessed of.
171
 
It is submitted that this perspective on Badenhorst gives 
credence to Riley A.J.’s view in YB v. SB that the consideration of 
trust assets (or their values) to determine the patrimonial 
consequences of divorce should be viewed broadly rather than 
restrictively, or, stated differently, should be capable of application 
also to matrimonial property regimes other than a complete 
separation of property where the redistribution of assets is at issue. 
The Judge said: 
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If I consider . . . the approach adopted by the SCA in 
Badenhorst . . . it seems to me that the principles laid out in 
Badenhorst as to when trust assets are to be held to form 
part of a spouse’s estate are not confined to s 7(3) [of the 
Divorce Act on the redistribution of assets] situations.
172
 
The eminent South African legal scholar H. R. Hahlo observed 
more than half a century ago that “when it comes to ‘trusts’ in our 
law, even the most elementary propositions cannot be regarded as 
settled.”173 This observation certainly rings true with regard to 
South African courts’ engagement with trusts within the context of 
the patrimonial consequences of divorce. Hahlo’s observation 
suggests, moreover, that the Supreme Court of Appeal’s 
pronouncements on point in Badenhorst v. Badenhorst and WT v. 
KT may not necessarily be the final word on the matter. 
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